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Abstract
Residential burglary in the United States has declined by over 80% across  the 
last  four decades, representing a major social phenomenon that remains largely 
unexplained. International research indicates a need for investigation of the secu-
rity hypothesis. Here,  50  years of studies  are examined chronologically.  A con-
sistent narrative emerges which indicates that household security, largely absent 
in the 1970s, improved gradually over time. Improvement  occurred via several 
mechanisms: the increased prevalence, quality, coverage,  and routine use of secu-
rity fixtures and fittings. In addition, crime displacement declined over time as 
fewer households offered easy crime opportunities, and the average age of burglars 
increased as juveniles found burglary increasingly difficult. Hence  the study con-
cludes that gradual  household security improvements played a central role in the 
decline in residential burglary. While the findings suggest a considerable revison is 
needed to our understanding of burglary and burglars, the likelihood that 50 years 
of diverse burglary research points in the same direction by chance, and without 
significant contrary evidence, seems remote. Further implications for theory, policy, 
and research are identified.
Keywords Burglary · Property crime · Crime decline · Crime drop · Juvenile crime · 
Security hypothesis · Securitization
Introduction
Residential burglary imposes significant financial and emotional costs on victims, 
their families and friends, and on society in general (Brown and Harris 1989; 
Shover 1991; Winkel and Vrij 1993; Miller et al. 1996; Cohen 2000; Beaton et al. 
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2000; Wickramasekera et  al. 2015). The monetary costs include the replace-
ment of stolen goods, repairs to damaged property, and the cost of the time to 
organize those activities. The monetary costs are often exceeded by the non-
monetary emotional and psychological costs to individuals and families of the 
intrusion and trespass. This violation and defilement of their property results in 
anger, shock, fear and difficulty sleeping (Budd 1999). The additional costs to 
society include the monetary costs of policing, criminal justice and private pre-
cautionary responses, health and psychological services, and the cost of the fear 
of crime engendered. Further, there are numerous cost multipliers from precur-
sor and subsequent crimes. This can include theft of a vehicle for travel to com-
mit a suburban burglary and transport stolen goods. Burglary can also escalate 
when household occupants are present, and can result in assault and rape, with 
Shover (1991, p. 78) concluding that “[t]he potential for physical harm to its vic-
tims places burglary near the top of offenses most feared by its citizens”. Bur-
glary cost are also multiplied via the further damage to society caused by re-sale 
markets for stolen goods, illicit drug markets that are funded by the proceeds of 
burglary, and violence associated with those markets (Felson and Clarke 1998). 
Longer-term costs are also incurred due to the progression along criminal careers 
that can occur when juveniles succeed in burglary (Owen and Cooper 2013), and 
due to the reduced employment and life prospects experienced by crime victims 
(Macmillan 2000).
Investigating two decades of increasing burglary rates following the Second 
World War, the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Admin-
istration of Justice concluded that
People can do much to insure their own safety and that of their families and 
belongings by reducing the opportunities for crime. Many crimes would not 
occur if individuals had proper locks on their doors and windows and enough 
lighting to discourage prowlers….
(President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 
1967, p. 288)
The sixfold increase in the residential burglary rate from the 1940s to the 1970s 
brought further attention, a subsequent Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) report con-
cluding that:
Household burglary ranks among the more serious felony crimes…[B]urglary 
is potentially a far more serious crime than its classification as a property 
offense indicates; for many victims, including those that avoid the trauma of 
personal confrontation, the invasion of their home on one or more occasions 
constitutes a violation that produces permanent emotional scars. (Bureau of 
Justice Statistics 1985, p. 1)
Another BJS report put burglary ‘at the heart’ of America’s crime problem:
Robbers and burglars exact heavy losses and suffering from their victims. The 
most numerous of the offenses that the public considers to be the most serious, 
many robberies and burglaries also fund illegal drug purchases. A cogent argu-
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ment can be made that controlling the incidence of these two crimes would 
strike at the heart of criminal behavior in the United States. (Perez 1992, p. 1)
and a third categorized burglary as of ‘high national concern’:
Of the crimes measured by the NCVS [National Crime Victimization Survey], 
many people find burglaries and violent crimes committed by strangers to be 
especially threatening. For the purposes of this report, these crimes have been 
termed crimes of high concern. (Bastion 1992, p. 8, emphasis in original)
By that time, however, the burglary rate was already in decline. And the decline con-
tinued such that, at the time of writing, it has been the dominant trend for between 
four and five decades (Rand et al. 1997; Walters et al. 2013; Fig. 1). Burglaries per 
household recorded by the police as the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) declined 
81.9% between 1980 and 2019. The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), 
which includes crimes not reported to the police, estimated an 83.0% decline 
between 1980 and 2019, or 84.6% if 1974 is taken as the reference year (Fig. 1).1 
A lack of research seeking to explain the decline in residential burglary was 
apparent two decades ago, when a National Institute of Justice researcher, writing 
in this journal, observed that “In contrast to the media and scholarly interest given 
to the recent drop in homicide rates and other violent crimes has been [an] almost 
complete lack of attention paid to the 25-year decline in US residential burglary 
rates…” (Titus 1999, p. 60). Some more recent studies of the violent crime drop 
do examine burglary. However, they largely focus on the violent crime drop from 
the early to mid-1990s when violence peaked, overlooking how burglary declined 
from the 1970s or early 1980s. Further, most such attempts to explain the crime 
Fig. 1  Burglaries per 1000 
households (Source: NCVS, 
UCR, US Census)
1 The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) is the most reliable source on residential burglary 
trends, measuring it from 1973 onwards, while burglaries reported to and recorded by the police, collated 
nationally by the FBI as the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) are available for longer. The trends track 
each other reasonably well over time (Biderman and Lynch 1991; Lynch and Addington 2007; Lauritsen 
et al. 2016). The household rates used here are based on the number of households estimated by the US 
Census Bureau.
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decline from the 1990s have been found lacking: There is little or no sound evidence 
to uphold propositions that crime declined due to, for example, increased impris-
onment, changes to policing, changes to abortion law, illicit drug markets, demo-
graphic change, childhood lead poisoning, and so on, and so such hypotheses are 
not the focus here because they are taken to have been largely falsified (Farrell 2013; 
Farrell et al. 2014).
The focus here is the security hypothesis, for which there is significant support-
ing evidence in relation to the international crime drop for other countries and crime 
types. A series of international studies find that crime declined because of security 
improvements, and did so without much, if any, crime displacement. The evidence 
is largely unequivocal in relation to vehicle crime, with strong corroborating evi-
dence from Australia, England and Wales, Germany, the Netherlands, and to some 
extent the US. Improvements to vehicle security, particularly the electronic immo-
bilizer and door deadlocks, were responsible for the decline in auto theft in those 
countries (Kriven and Ziersch 2007; Bӓssmann 2011; Farrell et al. 2011; Fujita and 
Maxfield 2012; Brown 2015a, b; van Ours and Vollaard 2016; Dixon and Farrell 
2020). The role of household security devices in declining residential burglary has 
not been subject to as much empirical study, but the existing work of most relevance 
is a series of British studies. These studies are discussed in more detail later but con-
clude that household security improvements, particularly improved door and win-
dow locks and security lighting, are largely responsible (Tilley et al. 2011, 2015a; 
Tseloni et al. 2016, 2017). The British studies benefitted from the Crime Survey for 
England and Wales, which collated several decades’ information on household secu-
rity device usage. Such information has not, to this author’s knowledge, been col-
lected in national victim surveys relating to the United States. There are, however, 
research studies relating to the US which contain some information about household 
security. The present study seeks to identify and synthesize that information, aiming 
to piece together a picture from five decades of diverse burglary studies.
The main theoretical reference points for this study are routine activities and 
rational choice, situational crime prevention and the security hypothesis. However, 
once these have been introduced briefly in this section, the focus is mainly on the 
evidence. The routine activities perspective indicates the importance of target suit-
ability, the capability of guardianship, and how often and where they converge with 
potential offenders in order for crime to occur (Cohen and Felson 1979). Offender 
decisions are taken to operate within the framework of bounded rationality (for col-
lections see Cornish and Clarke 1986; Piquero and Tibbetts 2002), which means that 
offenders take crime opportunities when they perceive benefits to outweigh costs. 
Offenders’ perceptions are subjective, and the costs and benefits of crime include 
monetary and non-monetary components. The perceived costs of committing res-
idential burglary include the time and effort required, the risk of arrest and pun-
ishment, the risk of bodily harm if interrupted, plus any possible emotional costs 
such as remorse. The perceived benefits include the monetary gain from stolen cash 
and fenced goods but also the benefit from excitement and feelings of power that 
some burglars report (Nee and Meenaghan 2006). Situational crime prevention iden-
tifies mechanisms by which crime is made more costly or less beneficial (Clarke 
2012, 2017), and the mechanisms by which different security devices work are here 
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interpreted within this framework. For the most part, household security devices 
trigger mechanisms that make burglary actually, or perceived to be, more difficult 
or riskier. Stronger window frames and locks, for example, harden the target and 
reduce access to a property, requiring time, effort and skill on behalf of offenders to 
overcome, or additional time and effort to identify a less secure property. Security 
lighting deters because it threatens detection, making residential burglary riskier, 
and so on (Sorensen 2003).
Method
This study collates information from previous studies of burglary and household 
security, and includes some supplementary analysis of burglar arrest data. Burglary 
studies that focus on security were identified through electronic literature searches, 
close examination of key burglary studies (particularly the major book-length stud-
ies), and from references in existing studies. However, it was soon apparent that 
household security is seldom mentioned in the title, abstract or keywords of burglary 
studies, and often comprises a secondary or tertiary concern. That is, in many of the 
major studies of burglary, including the majority of books on the subject, household 
security may form part of the study to varying degrees but is not the main focus. 
Hence these studies were examined to identify their components which relate to 
household security, and to identify potentially relevant further studies.
The supplementary analysis of trends in age-related burglar arrests uses data 
for 1980–2014 from the Bureau of Justice Statistics online arrest data tool (Sny-
der et al. 2017), and data from 1960 to 1979 as supplied by the FBI. It is generally 
accepted that, other things equal, trends in arrests are a reasonable indicator of those 
in offending, and there are significant precedents for using the data in the way it is 
used here (e.g. Blumstein et al. 1986; Farrington 1986; Snyder 2012).
Since the issue of security is often secondary or, for present purposes, ‘hidden’ 
within burglary studies that have a different primary focus, the possibility that some 
useful studies were not captured cannot be excluded. To that end, the corresponding 
author welcomes suggestions and critical comment. Methodologically, however, the 
key issue is whether the captured studies offer a representative picture of the history 
of US residential burglary and security. With respect to that issue, since the evi-
dence comes from multiple sources and methods spanning 50 years, and appears to 
point in the same general direction, this affords some confidence in the representa-
tiveness of the findings. That said, it is clear that the subject will benefit from further 
research, and some possibilities to that end are discussed later.
Findings
The extent and effectiveness of household security
A major study of 18 areas of Boston in the early 1970s specified that, for a door to be 
defined as secure, for purposes of the study, it must “(1) be of metal, metal panels, 
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solid wood, or hollow wood of three-quarter inch thickness, (2) have no unprotected 
glass near the door handle; (3) have no exposed hinges; (4) lock with either a three-
quarter inch dead latch or dead bolt or a vertical bolt.” (Reppetto 1974, p. 67). Only 
8% of households were found to have secure doors. That is, over 90% of households 
had at least one insecure door because “39% … were constructed of wood panel, 
26%.. had glass near the door handle, 8% [had] removable exterior hinges, and the 
remainder … inadequate locking systems.” (p. 67). Despite this, “burglary incidence 
did appear inversely related to … door security..” in middle class areas (p. 68). The 
reason the study could not assess the effectiveness of other specific security meas-
ures is telling: There were too few to evaluate! (p. 69). The study is generally con-
sidered a landmark in the field, and indicates that good quality household security 
was extremely scarce at that time.
With respect to burglars, the Boston study found that “only 6% could be rated 
as skilled. The typical burglar was young (under 25) and opportunistic. Thus, he 
relied on simple tools and techniques to attack his target.” (Reppetto 1984, p. 157). 
This squares with a Canadian review’s contemporary finding that “The notion that 
residential burglars employ relatively unskilled types of modus operandi is consist-
ent with the youth and inexperience of most persons committing burglary.” (Waller 
and Okihiro 1978, p. 26). Unskilled burglary by youths is an indirect indicator of the 
absence of good quality household security.
A landmark study from the 1980s found that
The most commonly used technique over the years is to “jimmie” a lock or 
window. All that is required is a door or window that does not have a bur-
glar proof lock and has a little play or give in it. In the case of a window, 
the burglar will work the window up and down until the fastener begins to 
loosen. A screwdriver or prybar might be used for extra leverage. (Rengert and 
Wasilchick 1985, p. 91).
This identifies three important factors: the absence of security, its inadequacy, and 
its lack of use. The study reported that “It takes just several minutes or less for a bur-
glar to walk through an unlocked door and walk out with valuables… Another less 
obvious form of carelessness is to leave the door of an attached garage open after 
leaving home in the car.” (p. 90). However, where good quality security existed it 
was found effective, such that.
most of the burglars we interviewed are easily discouraged by a tough lock. 
With so many opportunities, many burglars will move on rather than struggle 
with a deadbolt lock. (Rengert and Wasilchick 1985, p. 90).
This ‘moving on’ by burglars when faced with good quality security identifies a fur-
ther important factor: it implies a high rate of crime displacement at that time. Most 
households were insecure, so there were plentiful alternate targets, which meant dis-
placement was the easy option. Note also how this indicates that good quality locks 
could be effective but that the problem was their scarcity. 
In the early 1980s, 42% of burglaries nationally took place without a forced entry 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics 1985, p. 3), suggesting entry points that were either 
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without security, or were left open or unlocked. In line with this, Shover observed 
that “the world affords abundant poorly protected opportunities for burglars”, 
inferred from the fact that only “7% of [1980s] households had a burglar alarm” and 
these “worked properly less than half the time” (Shover 1991, p. 83). He also sug-
gests that burglary required little expertise at the time, when discussing a New York 
City study finding that “in more than half the incidents the burglars’ entry was either 
unforced or was gained simply by breaking a window or a lock.” (Shover 1991, p. 
84). The fact that Shover groups unforced entry together with breaking a window or 
lock strongly implies that break-in was trivially easy in many instances.
A New York State household survey conducted in 1983–1984 considered a wide 
range of area and household variables relating to guardianship and security. It used 
multivariate models to assess the effects of occupancy and security upon burglary 
and attempted burglary (Garafalo and Clarke 1992). It found that “Attempted door 
entries were less likely to succeed when locks were in use, when special outdoor 
lighting was used, and when the doors were visible to neighbors or from the side-
walk”, and that “a locked door is the most important factor in thwarting an offender 
who tries to enter a single-family housing unit via a door.” (p. 457). In the absence of 
occupants, the study found that security “such as locks, lights, and timers” was the 
most effective measure (p. 460). It also found the concurrent use of several measures 
was more effective. Overall this study suggests that, while rare, good quality secu-
rity that was used was effective. The importance of this study is that, whereas other 
studies discussed so far largely emphasised the absence or poor quality of security, 
this study emphasised the protective role of good quality household security. It also 
emphasized the importance of the use or activation of that security through use of 
terms such as a ‘locked’ door rather than solely noting how many doors were fitted 
with locks.
A cross-national comparative study of burglary to the mid-1980s identified a 
higher burglary rate in the US than in Canada or the UK (Mayhew 1987). It specu-
lated that this reflected unforced entries when doors and windows were left open 
in the summer due to higher temperatures and humidity in many US states (p. 46). 
The study thereby further recognised the importance of not just the presence but the 
routine use of security measures. Similarly, Winchester and Jackson (1982) reported 
that “22% of the respondents admitted that on the last occasion they had left the 
house empty during the day they had left at least one door or window open.” (p. 8). 
This study also identified the importance of partial security coverage, noting that:
There is no reason to think that partial security will be any more effective in 
preventing residential burglary than no security at all. Securing all doors into 
the house with mortice locks may for example provide no protection against 
burglary if a window is left open or protected by nothing more than a simple 
catch. (Winchester and Jackson 1982, p. 9)
Burglars elsewhere at this time were found to be largely undeterred by visible secu-
rity measures that  were easily overcome (Maguire and Bennett 1982). This was 
confirmed by a more extensive follow-up study which revealed that, even when a 
household had locks, seven in ten burglars were not deterred because those locks 
were easily overcome. Further, and consistent with the findings of Rengert and 
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Wasilchick discussed above, the remaining offenders reported that they typically 
displaced to another household because of the widespread availability of targets 
without good locks (Bennett and Wright 1984).2 Note, however, that those offenders 
who displaced also reported avoiding ‘Chubb locks’, ‘special’ and ‘difficult’ locks 
(p. 83). Therefore, this also strongly suggests the importance of the quality of secu-
rity measures, impacting upon offender decision-making relating to both initial tar-
get selection and displacement. A major study of US burglars conducted in the late 
1980s also reported that “nearly one half of the burglary sites in the present study 
were entered through open or unlocked windows and doors.” (Cromwell et al. 1991, 
p. 31), though such information is difficult to interpret unambiguously without addi-
tional information on the prevalence of household security.
The burglary rate had declined significantly by the time Wright and Decker 
(1994) conducted their classic study of St. Louis burglars. They interviewed expert 
burglars rather than the juvenile novices that had characterized burglary in previ-
ous years. These experts noted the effect of good quality security on their decision-
making, one reporting that
I don’t do dead bolt locks because sometimes you have to kind of kick the 
door, loosen it up. I don’t really like playing with dead bolts cause it takes too 
long. On picking locks, you can’t really pick a dead bolt lock. (Burglar 103, in 
Wright and Decker 1994, p. 122)
and another that
I wouldn’t mess with a house that has storm windows. I’m not gon say I’ve 
never done a house with storm windows, but it just takes more time tryin’ to 
do two windows. (Burglar 14 in Wright and Decker 1994, p. 98)
This is a reference to double-paned windows being more difficult to break, and it is 
likely that such windows also had stronger frames and a higher proportion of built-in 
locks. The insights provided by the St. Louis expert burglars are informative. First, 
the statements tend to suggest that, by the 1990s, security measures were generally 
playing a more prominent role in burglar decision-making. Second, if these expert 
burglars were deterred by good quality door and window security, we can reason-
ably infer an even greater effect upon youthful novices. The St. Louis study con-
cluded that:
The burglars seemed more unwilling than unable to overcome such obstacles; 
they just did not want to take the extra time and effort required. Since they 
were under pressure to act as quickly as possible, this makes sense. Add to this 
the fact that those who search for burglary sites with the intention of offend-
ing “there and then” have no foolproof way to predict the likely payoff, and 
the aversion to well-protected places is more sensible still. Why should they 
2 Readers should note that the decline in burglary in the UK began at least a decade later than in the US. 
This suggests that British studies from the 1980s may be more comparable, in terms of the prevailing 
burglary trend, to those from the US in the 1970s.
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invest extraordinary energy where the reward cannot be guaranteed? (Wright 
and Decker 1994, p. 98)
This shift in emphasis squares with the burglary rate having declined over a third 
between 1980 and 1990. The St. Louis expert burglars demonstrated an aversion to 
deadbolts and storm windows, that is, good quality security, and the prominence of 
these statements is consistent with increases in the prevalence, quality and use of 
household security.
Security improvements to already-burglarized household were found effective as 
part of a package of measures in the 1980s (Pease 1991; Mawby 2001), a finding 
corroborated by a number of studies in different developed countries through the 
1990s and early 2000s (Grove et al. 2012; Bowers and Johnson 2017). One study 
concluded that burglar-proof windows and doors reduced burglary by a quarter in 
the Netherlands from 1999 (Vollaard and van Ours 2011).
By the early twenty-first century, a review of residential burglary published by the 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services concluded that household security 
could be effective, and that:
Target-hardening makes getting into houses more difficult for burglars, and 
includes installing the following: sturdy doors with dead bolts; window locks, 
rather than latches; doublepane, storm or divided light windows, or laminated 
glass that is forced-entry resistant; pin locks on windows and sliding glass 
doors; and sliding glass door channel locks or slide bolts. … Door security 
may be influenced as much by the door’s sturdiness as by its lock. Regardless, 
residents should use, rather than simply install, security devices. (Weisel 2005, 
p. 28)
A quantitative analysis of victim survey data showed that physical security measures 
such as door and window locks were closely linked to households with lower bur-
glary rates (Budd 1999), while a 2007 review of statistical modeling of burglary in 
the US concluded that
physical protection (i.e., “hardening”) of homes, including locking doors, 
installing alarms, and light timer devices, have also been shown to correlate 
with burglary victimization (Miethe and McDowall 1993; Miethe and Meier 
1990, 1994; Wilcox Rountree and Land 1996, Wilcox et al. 1994).” (Wilcox 
et al. 2007, p. 774).
The same study indicated that target hardening measures and defensible space were 
the most effective guardianship measures, and that physical security measures were 
more effective in residential areas where a greater proportion of households had 
similarly high levels of household security (p. 794). This is consistent with offenders 
being more likely to displace in areas with a higher proportion of insecure house-
holds. It is conceivable that the level of security in an area really determines what is 
sometimes termed collective efficacy.
A quantitative analysis of anti-burglary devices found that “combinations 
[of security devices] with door and window locks plus external lights or security 
chains confer at least 20 times greater protection against burglary with entry than 
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no security.” (Tseloni et al. 2016, p. 646). The study concluded that the decline in 
burglary in England and Wales from the early 1990s was attributable to the spread 
of insulated windows with double-paned glass, stronger frames and integrated locks, 
and to the spread of interior and exterior security lighting. Three main factors were 
identified as responsible for the decline in burglary. First, there was a rapid decline 
in the prevalence of households without any security devices. Second there was an 
increased use of good quality, that is, effective, security devices, particularly door 
and window deadlocks and security lighting. Third, there was greater use of com-
binations of such devices, and this was found to confer disproportionate protection 
(Tilley et al. 2015a; Tseloni et al. 2017). Note, however, that the effects of different 
security devices were found to vary greatly, including the finding that household 
alarms were ineffective in recent years (Tilley et al. 2015b), consistent with the bet-
ter known fact that most alarm activations are false (Sampson 2007). Cross-national 
analyses of the International Crime Victims Survey had earlier shown that many 
European countries with declining burglary had increased rates of household secu-
rity (van Dijk 2008; Sorensen 2003). Overall, while the timing and rate of spread of 
security differs between the US and Europe, as might be expected in different coun-
tries with different housing stock and differing burglary problems, there is a great 
deal of consistency in the international evidence from burglary studies.
Relatively recent interviews with expert burglars found that “Around half of our 
sample of burglars in 2006 had noticed increased security measures taken by house-
holders in recent years, but the most common method of entry to their most recent 
target had been through an open window or door.” (Nee 2015, p. 58). The low rate 
of burglaries at the time of the study suggests that by the 2000s, open doors and 
windows were rare, that even the older expert burglars had resorted to entering only 
through much sought-after open windows and doors, and that closed windows and 
doors were too secure even for experts (indicating good quality security devices in 
routine use). These findings resonate with the views of offenders in Australia who 
reported that security improvements were the most likely explanation for the prop-
erty crime decline in that country (Brown 2015a, b).
Consistent with earlier studies, recent research finds offenders aware of cues indi-
cating the age and quality of physical security measures. There are indications that 
expert burglars recognized the changes to household security that took place over 
time, one reporting “That [door] would be easy. The lock on that door looks like 
an old one. The newer ones have thicker handles around them and are harder to get 
through.” (Armitage 2018, p. 296). Consistent with earlier findings, the same expert 
burglars reported burglar alarms were not a deterrent.
A study of burglaries that occurred between 2001 and 2005 in Newark, New Jer-
sey, compared the location of burglaries and alarms (Lee and Wilson 2013). Both 
were found to be spatially concentrated but without significant overlap. Lee and Wil-
son interpret the lack of overlap as reflecting the effectiveness of alarms in reduc-
ing burglary and causing a spatial shift in burglary patterns, such that it remained 
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primarily in non-alarmed areas. Elsewhere, surveillance and physical security were 
the design factors mentioned most by burglars (Armitage and Monchuk 2011; 
Armitage 2013).
Gated communities have been found to be diverse in nature but generally to 
reduce burglary (Addington and Rennison 2013). However, while the spread of 
gated communities may have reduced local burglary rates, their contribution to the 
US residential burglary decline remains undetermined. A more recent north Amer-
ican study found that spatial change in the distribution of burglaries, particularly 
that linked to buildings with entry key fobs, was consistent with that expected as 
the result of improvement to home security technologies. Specifically, it used “a 
spatial data signature between perceived access to home security technologies and 
declines in residential burglary to support the security hypothesis.” (Hodgkinson 
and Andresen 2019, p. 98).
Smart household security is becoming more prevalent at the time of writing. 
A small but growing number of households include a suite of smart security with 
remote control and monitoring and remote video internally and for arrivals at the 
door, coordinated via smartphone apps. A review notes that household smart locks
let you receive alerts and track who’s entering and leaving your abode; email 
limited-access digital "keys" to visitors, children, trusted service workers or 
guests when you’re not home; and remotely lock and unlock when you’re away 
from home... [Y]ou could program a night mode action that locks the doors 
and also turns off the lights and closes the shades. If a friend, family member 
or service worker rings your smart doorbell while you’re away, you can visu-
ally confirm who it is via the smart doorbell, then remotely unlock the door to 
let them in. (Wolpin 2016)
Since experienced burglars often undertake checks for occupancy by knocking 
on the door, remote conversation may disrupt such checks, or at least provide pho-
tographic evidence of who arrived at the door. Manufacturers of smart household 
security also need to beware of interception, breach and hacking (Thomson 2016). 
That is, continued iterations of household security need to be secure to avoid adap-
tation by burglars that could result in renewed offender interest in household bur-
glary. However, while we might hope that such recent developments may consoli-
date declines in burglary, they are too recent to have played a role in the longer-term 
decline.
The population of burglars
So far it has been shown that, when homes were insecure in the 1960s to 1980s, 
burglars required little skill or experience. Most burglars were young. This section 
examines age using arrest data from the BJS and FBI, noting that previous studies 
have observed that the decline in burglary was disproportionately a decline in ado-
lescent offending (Butts 2000; Snyder 2012).
Figure 2 shows how, across the years that burglary declined, there was an increase 
in the proportion of older, and a decrease in the proportion of younger, burglars. 
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As a proportion of burglars arrested, between 1980 and 2010, those age under 17 
declined from over 50% to less than 20% of those arrested,   with a corresponding 
increase in burglars aged over 25. This is consistent with the younger, less experi-
enced burglars, being more easily deterred. As household security improved over 
time, the proportion of older and more expert burglars increases. By the late 2010s, 
the average burglar was significantly older and more experienced. These trends 
are consistent with the range of studies examined so far that have touched on issues 
of burglar age, skill and experience.
The importance of the long-term change in age of burglars is straightforward. It 
provides a single over-time indicator spanning the decades of interest which corre-
sponds with the other evidence.
Discussion
The primary justification for this study was the absence of reliable explanation for 
a major social phenomenon: the four-decade and over 80% decline in residential 
burglary  in the US. The study’s contribution is to provide an explanation, based 
on significant supporting evidence, to fill the gap in knowledge. The study identi-
fied a clear over-time progression in the narrative relating to burglary and security. 
In the 1970s, household security was sparse and ineffective whereas by the 2000s 
there was more and better security. The first two columns of Table  1 summarize 
aspects of household security of the 1970s and 1980s that were identified as impor-
tant. First, the prevalence of security used to be low and few households had much 
if any security (Reppetto’s 1974; Bureau of Justice Statistics 1985; Winchester and 
Jackson 1982; Rengert and Wasilchick 1985; Cromwell et al. 1991; Shover 1991). 
Second, the importance of insufficient or partial coverage of households was identi-
fied (Repetto 1974; Winchester and Jackson 1982; Bureau of Justice Statistics 1985; 
Rengert and Wasilchick 1985; Cromwell et al. 1991; Shover 1991). Third, security 
quality was low and it was easily overcome—windows and door were ‘jimmied’, 
frames and single-pane glass easily broken to gain entry (Repetto 1974; Winchester 
and Jackson 1982; Bureau of Justice Statistics 1985; Rengert and Wasilchick 1985; 
Fig. 2  Burglary arrests by age 
group 1960–2014 (Source: BJS, 
FBI)











































































































































































































































































































































Cromwell et  al. 1991, Shover 1991). Fourth, even where decent security existed, 
doors and windows were often left unlocked (Repetto 1974; Bureau of Justice Sta-
tistics 1985; Winchester and Jackson 1982; Rengert and Wasilchick 1985; Cromwell 
et al. 1991; Shover 1991). In addition, there was evidence that while displacement 
used to be easy when many insecure households were available as alternative targets 
(Bennett and Wright 1984; Rengert and Wasilchick 1985; Shover 1991), it became 
more difficult and less likely to occur as households became more secure (Nee and 
Meenaghan  2006). The major change over time in the average age of burglars is 
consistent with the expected effect of improved household security in reducing the 
involvement of juveniles more than older offenders.
The means by which it is suggested security improvements were achieved over 
time are summarized in the third column of Table 1. As the market for household 
security expanded, it brought new buyers and sellers, stimulating more and better 
security technologies (with stronger materials and more resistant locks). Over time, 
as competition and economies of scale lowered per-unit prices, previously ‘special’ 
security devices became routine precautions (Felson and Clarke 1995). This is con-
sistent with a product lifecycle as demand increases, and with the nature of the dif-
fusion of technology (Rogers 1962). As the prevalence of security increased, so too 
did its quality and coverage, its routine use, and the use of combinations of devices 
at the same household. Over time, households became increasingly likely to include 
integrated deadlocks and locks in doors and windows which had stronger frames, 
multiple panes of more resistant glass, and other built-in security devices. This made 
crime displacement increasingly difficult, burglars needing more time and expertise 
to locate and enter fewer insecure households.
By the third decade of the twenty-first century, the problem of burglary has been 
significantly addressed, but is far from solved. An increasing proportion of house-
holds are more secure by default. This is evident in how different security devices 
work in different ways, the more dramatic effect of multiple devices, and the aging 
of burglars as household security improved. It has been suggested that , as burglary 
has declined, the responsible security has become increasingly elegant, increasing 
rather than reducing liberty and quality of life (Farrell and Tilley 2020).
While the pace and extent of change to household security will have varied sig-
nificantly from one region, city, town or area to the next, and in many instances from 
one household to the next, such variation would be around a national mean. Fur-
ther research to examine such variation has the potential to complement the present 
study.
It is clear that some types of security device are more effective than others. Effec-
tiveness will also vary between brands for different types of device: this was reported 
by offenders in relation to locks (some avoiding ‘difficult’ locks such as ‘Chubbs’). 
With respect to particular devices, the evidence suggests stronger door and windows 
panels, frames and locks, and security lighting are effective, but alarms less effective 
or  ineffective, and such nuances are important in relation to potential implications 
for the multi-billion dollar security industry.
Security, insurance and housing industry records are potentially rich sources 
of information on security product sales by types, model and make, the Standards 
and tests required, and the history of the evolution of devices: Churchill (2016) and 
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others demonstrate the value of researching the history of security. Industry records 
may indicate sales of particular locks and types of windows, doors and materials. 
Archival research and the examination of the timing and nature of lock and security 
light patents may provide useful indicators of change over time.
Further investigation of the best ways to promote the development and imple-
mentation of security would seem appropriate. This indicates the need for further 
incentivization of industry—ncluding but not limited to the construction industry, 
security device and fittings manufacturers and the home insurance industry. In addi-
tion to measures to address burglary, this approach may prove fruitful in relation to 
industry whose products and work affects a wide range of crime types (Tilley 2018).
Conclusion
This study offers an explanation for a major social phenomenon on: the 80% 
decline in US residential burglary spanning four decades. The study examined bur-
glary research spanning five decades and found that a consistent picture emerged. 
Almost as remarkable was the lack of identifiable contrary evidence. The likelihood 
that the findings have emerged from diverse studies and methods due to chance 
seems remote. Hence, the main conclusion of this study is that household security 
improvements played the central role in the long-term decline in US residential bur-
glary. This conclusion squares well with previous research into the security hypoth-
esis for other countries and crime types, and so while additional research evidence is 
always to be preferred, it seems reasonable to suggest that the burden of proof now 
lies with others to challenge this explanation or provide compelling evidence for an 
alternative.
The evidence suggested that four aspects of household security change played a 
central role: (1) the increased prevalence of security, (2) better quality, that is more 
robust and effective, security devices and fittings, (3) increasingly uniform security 
coverage within households  and, (4) greater routine use of security devices.  As a 
result, there was reduced likelihood of offender displacement. The relative contribu-
tions of these features is something that future research might examine.
This study approached the subject chronologically. This facilitated a reinterpre-
tation of the burglary literature, and helped  reconcile seemingly diverse findings. 
While the earlier burglary literature had little positive to say about household secu-
rity, more recent studies made clear that even older expert burglars had developed a 
begrudging respect.
The study identified the disproportionate impact of security improvements upon 
crime by younger offenders. This suggests promising avenues for juvenile crime and 
justice research. Put simply, making crime more difficult to commit may be the most 
effective way to reduce juvenile crime and progression to adult crime. In the long-
term, this continues to  reduce juvenile and adult justice costs as fewer offenders 
enter the system and do so less frequently. To suggest that reducing crime opportu-
nities is likely to be the most effective means of reducing juvenile crime and crimi-
nal careers is, of course, quite a significant challenge to orthodox views on this topic 
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and on crime in general. It suggests that consideration of the role of security, and of 
reducing crime opportunities more generally, should be more central in crime theo-
ries, research and policy than they are at present.
Absent complacency,  household security in the US and elsewhere should  con-
tinue to improve, reflecting housing market expansion and churn as older homes 
are replaced or refurbished, and as economies of scale and competition further 
reduce the price of security fixtures and fittings. The   development of technology 
that avoids or reduces crime opportunities represents society’s main comparative 
advantage over offenders.  The growth of smart security suggests the possibility 
for new offender means of entry to households using hacking and social engineer-
ing. Assuming smart security overcomes such threats and is effective, it should also 
decline in price and become more widespread. This all suggests that the next gen-
eration of crime research should consider more extensive routine measurement of 
security of different types in different sectors of society.
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